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THE TEXAS AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By
CHARLE.S E. CLARK*
When twenty-one lawyers and judges bring to fruition in the short
space of eight months a task so extensive as the preparation of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, it is obvious that a great deal of devoted
effort, supported and made effective by a fine co-operative spirit, must
have gone into the work. One who from outside the State views this
achievement with some experience of the difficulties which attend an
undertaking of such magnitude must necessarily express his admiration
and tender his congratulations to those who shared in the accomplish-
ment. Wisely he might well stop there, and avoid any attempt at
detailed evaluation of the rules themselves. Unfamiliarity with local
habits or peculiar local problems, indeed of vested interests in particu-
lar ways of doing things, may well suggest caution in deducing general
and too extensive conclusions from a study of the product alone. But
the movement for procedural reform which developed vigorous force
with the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
so important that any feature it brings forth, whether aiding or retard-
mng the general hope, now so strong, of procedural simplicity and
uniformity, should be weighed and carefully appraised. Only by
study and attempted evaluation of the various state developments can
we expect to keep the cause of procedural reform from becoming static,
just as though all advance must end with 1938. Therefore, I have
deemed it an obligation to respond as best I could to the request of the
editors for a comparison of the Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The impact of the federal rules on state procedure has shown itself
in three different ways. Two states-Arizona and Colorado--have
adopted the federal rules substantially in toto, even preserving the
identical numbering of the individual rules.I This is the course which
*B.A., LL.B., Yale, LL.D., Colo., Gettysburg, Tulane; Professor and Dean of the
School of Law, Yale University, 1929-39; author of CODE PLEADING (1928), and
COVENANTS AND OTH n AGREEMENTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929); reporter and
member of the Advisory Committee to the Uiited States Supreme Court, on Federal
Civil Procedure, 1935-39; United States Circuit Judge, 2d Circuit.
1ARuz. RULES Civ. PRoc., effective January 1, 1940; Sunderland, Arizonds New
Rules of Civil Procedure Effect Conformity with Federal Rules (1940) 23 J. A.
JUD. Soc. 215; Lockwood, Arizona and the New Federal Rules (1940) 26 A.B.A.J.
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has been recommended by bar associations; thus in Florida and Oregon,
the associations or committees thereof have shown how the federal
rules can be completely applied to the state system.2 A second course
is the adoption of substantial parts of the federal system, covering
specific topics, with rejection-at least for the present-of the re-
mainder. This has been followed by Pennsylvailia and South Dakota.3
This is a plan which requires the bar to learn a new system without
obtaining the full benefits of modern procedural thinking. Moreover,
it is a plan fraught with particular danger if not carried out with the
greatest of care. Thus, South Dakota has adopted the new rules of
joinder of parties, without considering the interrelation of this topic
with joinder of causes of action.4 By continuing the old code limita-
tions on joinder of causes, South Dakota has made exactly the same
-mistake as was made in New York in 1921, where it led to some pain-
fully and universally condemned decisions largely nullifying the
reform. There followed in New York a struggle for change to the
form which an enlightened committee had recommended long before,
but the correction was only recently secured after some fifteen years
of agitation.5 That South Dakota may thus repeat the proven mistakes
413; CoLO. RUILES Civ. PRoc., effective April 6, 1941; Blount, Improving the Admin-
istration of Justice-New Colorado Civil Rules of Procedure (1941) 27 A.B.A.J. 158.
This has not meant slavish adherence to all features of the new federal rules; for
instance, Colorado preserves its own system of relation of judge and jury. Colo. Laws
1939, c. 80, p. 964; COLO. RULES Civ. PRoc. (1941) Rule 51.
2in Florida the Supreme Court has refused to proceed on the theory of inherent
rule-making power and in the absence of a statute. (1941) 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 149,
190; Phillips, Should the Rules of Federal. Civil Procedure be Adopted in Florida?
(1940) 14 FLA. L. J. 339, 26 A.B.A.J. 873; (1940) 15 FLA. L. J. 91; (1940) 14 FLA. L. J.
234; (1940) 14 FLA. L. J. 305; (1940) 14 FLA. L. J. 382. In Oregon the report of the
judicial administrative committee was voted down. (1941) 24 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 192.
3Pennsylvania has made some eleven changes along federal lines. 332 Pa. xliv,
335 Pa. xxxiv, 337 Pa. la, 12 PA. STAT., Appendix 85-176; Faught, Work of Penn-
sylvania Rules Committee (1940) 24 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 26. For South Dakota, see
(1939) 23 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 20, and SOUTH DAxOTA RULES (1939), incorporated into
S. D. CODE (1939) §§33.0101 et seq.
4S. D. Supreme Court Rule 113 (1939), S. D. CODE (1939) §33.0916. See Clark,
Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform (1940) 24 J_ Am. JUD. Soc. 121.
5N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 339, amending N. Y. Crv. PIRAc. ACT §258. For the history
of this reform, see FIRST REPORT OF JUDIC1AL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK
(1935) 44, and the many criticisms of Ader v. Blau, 241 N.Y. 7., 148 N.E. 771, 41
A.L.R. 1216 (1925), as listed in CLArK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (2d ed.
1940) 748; 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 153; 2 id. at 2116, 2180; CLARX,
CODE PLEADING (1928) 272, 297, citing also 1 Report of the N. Y. Board of Statutory
Consolidation (1915), Rules 180, 181, rejected in N. Y. Cv. PAc. Aar §268. For a
somewhat similar experience in North Carolina, see Grady v. Warren, 201 N.C. 693,
161 S.E. 319 (1931).
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of New York and other states does not speak well for the willing-
ness' of lawyers to learn by experience outside their own immediate
jurisdiction. And the third and final course is rather complete rejection
-in spite of the already outstanding success generally conceded it-of
the federal system, a course which is unusual, but which seems to have
been pursued in the ifew Alabama rules, whose admitted inspiration
is the ancient English Chancery practice, with its old procedural dis-
tinctions now long since abolished in England and in almost all the
states.6
Now the new Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, effective September
1, 1941, probably should be classed as of the second group, although
this statement must be taken with very definite limitations. Notwith-
standing persuasive arguments of a bar association committee and
others that the federal rules should be adoptedJ the result shows
rather less use of these rules than in all the other jurisdictions cited
except Alabama. First, we may note the general plan of statement
of the rules, and particularly the amount of material presented. The
federal rules were designed not only to provide for an uncomplicated,
flexible, and uniform system of'procedure, but also to be simple, concise,
and clear in statement. Only 86 rules were needed to set forth this
system. The Texas rules number 822, and previously existing statutes
not listed or repealed are expressly continued by Rule 819. Although
included are the rules of the appellate courts and of justices of the
peace, yet these cover only a little more than one-quarter of the bulk.
Herein are to be found various details of practice not usually stated
in formal rules, such as the order in which a trial must proceed,
beginning with the reading of the petition, and then of the answer,
and so on (Rule 265), or who is leading counsel (Rule 8). Even
though much of this material apparently comes from previously ex-
isting statutes, it is questionable whether it properly can be considered
part of a concise, simply stated system which should give ample scope
to the trial court's discretion.8 Seemingly the plan followed was to
6Sims, New Alabama Equity Rules (1940) 1 ALA. LAW. 13; Rep. Com. of the Bar
Appointed to Aid the Supreme Court of Alabama in the Preparation of a New
System of Rules for Equity Procedure in Alabama Courts (1939) 3-7.7See Report of Committee on Remedial Procedure, Federal Rules Would Remove
Abuses (1940) 3 TE s B. J. 299; Rogers, Federal Rules for Texas (1940) 3 TEXAS
B. J. 235; and cf. Jones, Procedural Reform and the Apostles of Status Quo (1940)
3 TEXAS B. J. 137; McDonald, Background of the Texas Procedural Rules (1941)
19 TExAs LAW REviEw 229.
gIncluded also are other rules presumably necessary because of settled local views
restricting the powers of a judge sitting with a jury, but objectionable where the
common law view of the judge as a directing agency of justice obtains. See TEXAS
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include in the rules substantially all statutes concerning procedure-
of course with occasional alterations-together with the existing rules
of the various courts and certain new reforms engrafted upon them.
It is, in effect, the cumulative, not the integrative, method of procedural
reform.9
Next, it appears upon examination that not a great amount of the
federal material was actually adopted. Thirty-five of the federal
rules are cited as being used in whole or in part. But of these, often
only one subdivision or even a seritence or two of a rule covering
several subdivisions has become a part of the local rule. By count of
actual typed pages we find that just about one-fifth of the federal
reform made its way into the new Texas system. Since therein in-
cluded are many rules of a formal and certainly non-revolutionary
character-such as those for time periods and enlargement thereof,
assignment lists, taking effect of the rules, rules by other courts, and
the like-the actual impact of the new reform on Texas procedure
seems slight. This appears the clearer when the nature of the material
adopted is considered. The chief topic explicitly adopted is that of
joinder of parties; here the Federal Rules 19-23 are taken over practi-
cally in entirety in local rules 39-43, though the local rule on inter-
vention (Rule 60) is continued in place of the Federal Rule 24. It
seems only fair to note, however, that free joinder of parties has now
become one of the commonplaces of procedural reform, perhaps the
first matter regularly taken up; and since the federal system follows
tbat initiated by England, and adopted by many states, such as New
York, New Jersey, California, and Illinois, the innovation is not great.10
Beyond this, local rules showing a really substantial use of federal
material are few, indeed. They include those adopting certain details
only of the rules concerning averments in pleadings, pre-trial pro-
cedure, certain special topics in discovery, though not the general
federal system, third-party and counterclaim practice (with important
Rv _ns Civ. Pnoc. (1941) Rules 272, 275, requiring among other things that the
judge write out his charge and submit it to counsel at the close of the evidence,
and then read it to the jury, before the argument is begun and in the precise words
in which it is written. Contra, FEn. RuiS CIrv. Pnoc. Rule 51.9This appears particularly with respect to the present complicated statement of
the rules of pleading proper, TnxAs Ruirs Crv. Pnoc. (1941) Rules 45-98, as con-
trasted with the, at least, clear-cut statement of the former District and County
Court Rules 1-25, 104 Tex. 659, 142 S.W. xvii (1912). See note 28 infra.10See Blune, Free Joinder of Parties, Claims and Counterclaims, A. B. A. Jun.
ADM. MONOGE.ApHs, Ser. A, No. 11 (1941); CLArx, CoDE PL.EAxNG (1928) cc. 6, 7,
and 10; CLAny, CAsEs ON PLEAD N AND Pnocnuuxn (2d ed. 1940) cc. 15-20; MooRx,
FEDzaAL PRAmcE (1938) cc. 13, 18, and 20; Legis. (1937) 37 COL. L. Rnv. 462.
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limitations noted below), certain material from the rules on injunction
(which were not original with the federal rules)," and certain of the
material on making up the appellate record. This, I believe, is an
entirely fair r6sum6; in some ways it makes the borrowing seem more
extensive and less formal than it actually is, as may appear from the
later discussion herein. It will be noticed how many federal rules are
not touched at all-important rules such as those on summary judg-
ments and declaratory judgments or the general examination before
trial-and how limited is the borrowing in other aspects.
And that brings us, at length, to some consideration of the borrow-
ing actually made. Has that improved the procedure, or has it perhaps
at times introduced new problems? Of course, it is to be expected
that at least some improvement has resulted. I think we can say
dogmatically that the joinder rules are very good, even though only a
limited and logical extension of existing procedure, and a commonplace
of procedural reform, had the federal rules never existed. And if
piecemeal reform is ever desirable, we may add that the good, so far as
it goes, outweighs the bad in the changes. But that there is bad-
sources of confusion and even downright retreat-se.ems clear. A
striking case is found in the counterclaim rules, in a provision brought
in, strangely enough, by amendment this spring after the original
rules were adopted-a provision which is reminiscent of the South
Dakota repetition of the New York mistake referred to above. The
amended Rule 87 contains a new section (g) reading: "Tort shall not
be the subject of set-off or counterclaim against a contractual demand
nor a contractual demand against tort unless it arises out of or is
incident to or connected with same." This goes against the whole
spirit of modern joinder, which is that all points of irritation among
the parties may (and even perhaps should) be brought out into the
open and disposed of at one time, as a matter of convenience to the
court and the parties, and as a sound policy to end litigation among
them as promptly as possible.' 2  And it brings back old procedural
IlFED. RULES Civ. PROC. Rule 65, which repeats 28 U.S.C.A. §§381-383 and Equity
Rule 73. See Advisory Committee's NOTES TO THE RULES OP CIVIL PRocEDUR
(1938) Rule 65.
i2Pike, Objections to Pleadings under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1937) 47 YALE L. J. 50; Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-
II. Pleadings and Parties (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291 at 1307, 1308; Clark, The Bar
and the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure (1939) 25 A.B.A.J. 22; Millar, Nota-
bilia of American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937 (1937) 50 HA v. L. REV. 1017 at
1034-1039; FED. RULES Civ. PRoc. Rule 12. Compare, also, Blume, Free Joinder
of Parties, Claims and Counterclaims, A. B. A. JUD. ADM. MONOGRAPHS, Ser. A, No.
11 (1941).
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confusion by limiting adjudication within the confines of certain pro-
cedural forms which turn upon definitions not clear and precise in
themselves. Indeed, the limitation is substantially that of the old codes
which limit counterclaims to those "arising out of the same transac-
tion," and which led to so much useless litigation.- In New York it
took some sixteen years of agitation to secure its repeal after the initial
practice act had unwisely included it.' 4 I can see no argument what-
soever for what seems to me to be a decided step backward, and can
only surmise the reasons which might have induced such a retreat
after the rules had actually been adopted.
Another change which perhaps may be interconnected, since it came
into the rules by the same course-late amendment-is one appearing
in both the third-party and the counterclaim rules (Rules 38, 97). It
is that each of these rules "shall not be applied, in tort cases, so as to
permit the joinder of a liability or indemnity insurance company,
unless such company is by statute or contract liable to the person
injured or damaged." Why such special favor, such unusual restric-
tion, should be accorded for the benefit of one form of business is not
ifidicated. For this is a quite usual type of situation to which the
third-party rule is made applicable, and there seems no good reason
for denying it here. 5 The Texas rule does include the novel feature
of the federal rule introducing the additional concept of liability not
only to the defendant, but also to the plaintiff, a feature of the rule
which has been little used and the implications of which are not wholly
clear.16 But its inclusion affords no reason for this restriction. Pos-
sibly there may be some thought of unfair prejudice to an insurance
company before a jury, and so on; but that is completely taken care
"3Compare authorities cited in note 10 supra, and Note L. R. A. 1916C 445-514.
14N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 324, incorporated into N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, §§262, 266;
SECOND REPORT OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF Nnw YORK (1936) 117, 123;
Legis. (1937) 37 COL. L. lEv. 462.
16Compare Commentary (1940) 2 FED. RuLrs Smw. 650; 3 id. at 696; PRoCariNms
OF THE INSTITUTE AT CLExELAND (1938) 276, 329; Nesbit, New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Defense of Tort Action Covered by Casualty Insurance (1939)
25 A.B.A.J. 348; Poteat, Third Party Practice Under the New Rules (1939) 25
A.B.A.I 858; Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as Party Defendant
(1938) 22 MAnQ. L. REv. 75; and McKenna, Joining the Insurer and Insured in
Automobile Cases (1933) 17 MI tQ. L. REv. 114; and compare Gregory, LEGIsLATV
Loss DIsnui3IUoN IN NEGLIGENCE AcTIONS (1936) passim, and §7 of the UNIFOnm
COMNUBUTION AMoNG ToRTamAsoas ACT (1939), proposed jointly by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
10(1940) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 751; Commentary (1940) 3 FED. RuLm SEmr. 775;
(1941) 4 id. at 900; Koeningsberger, Suggestions for Changes in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (1941) 4 FED. Rur s Stov. 1010 at 1012.
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of, as experience elsewhere demonstrates, by the provision for separate
trials in Rules 97(h) and 174(b). 17 That a major restriction on the
procedure can thus be so easily secured at the very outset bodes ill
for the general and unexceptional use of the effective impleader practice.
Mention may be made of others of the 1941 amendments which seem
to be retrogressive: the incorporation of strict venue provisions into
third-party practice, Rule 38g; the restriction in Rule 67 of "amend-
ments" to conform to issues tried without objection (taken from
Federal Rule 15b) to those formally made before submission instead of
"at any time, even after judgment"; the elimination of the provision for
the "physical and mental examination of persons," Rule 168, after the
federal rule had been sustained in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.17a; and the
restoration of the required claim of jury in open court, in addition to
the adequate and unambiguous requirement of a jury fee.' 8
It does not seem desirable for the purpose I have in mind that a
separate examination of detached rules be made. But a final glance
at the system of pleading here contemplated-the heart of any pro-
cedural system-will, I think, make entirely clear my reactions to the
recent Texas revision. The well understood objective of the federal rules
was not merely brief rules simply stated, but a form of general concise
pleading which should require little time of the parties and the court
in debate on questions of form and should prevent successive shadow
boxing on pleading issues to the delay of actual trial on the merits. 9
To the same end, provision was made for aids in getting to the issue
rapidly, or discovering all features of one's own or one's opponent's
case and making them available for trial, or summarily disposing of
cases where no real issues were presented-the important pre-trial,
deposition ahd discovery, and summary judgment procedures.20 There
is no question that this system has met with practically universal
17See note 16 supra; Comment (1937) 12 Wis. L. REV. 531 at 536.
37a312 U.S. 1 (1941).
18TEXAS RuLEs CiV. PROC. (1941) Rule 216. For the need for and the clear work-
ing of simple provisions for jury claim, see James, Trial by Jury and the New Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 1022; Pike and Fischer, Pleadings
and Jury Rights in the New Federal Procedure (1940) 88 U. op PA. L. REV. 645.
"9See note 12 supra.
2FED. RULIES Civ. PRoc. Rules 16-37, 56. Laws and Stockman, Pre-Trial Con-
ferences, A. B. A. JUD. ADM. MONOGaAPHS, Ser. A, No. 4 (1941); Clark, Summary
Judgments and a Proposed Rule of Court (1941) 25 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 20, A. B. A. JUD.
AD. MONOGMAPHS, Ser. A, No. 5 (1941); 4 FED. RULES Smnv. 1005.
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approval of bench and bar, and has gone into effect without a sub-
stantial ripple of difficulty. -' That is why it is now considered a model
which other procedures may well follow.
Now in comparing the Texas pleading rules with the federal system
we may consider first the detailed rules and second the pleading system
as a whole. As to the first, there is no question of the desire of the
Texas revisers to provide for simple informal statements; indeed, that
was in line with the previous experience in the State. Hence here
(in Rules 45 et seq.) they have adopted many of the federal rules for
simple clear statements, for alternative or hypothetical pleading, for
joining many claims. And yet, as if to make assurance doubly sure,
they have not only rewritten the federal rules to a considerable extent,
but then have also incorporated their own local rules.
If the result achieves the simplicity the draftsmen have in mind,
certainly one should not protest the method. But it is clear that the
decisive precedents already being developed in the federal practice
can be applied only to a limited extent, if at all, to the rewritten rules;
it seems possible that the repetition of admonitions in different lan-
guage may cause difficulties of interpretation; and if experience else-
where is a guide the very excess of protestation may create new prob-
lems. Thus the federal rule (8a) requires of a pleader simply "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." And perhaps more important from the standpoint of prac-
tical assistance are the twenty-seven official forms designed to indicate
"the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.I 22
In the Texas rules there are no forms to guide, but in addition to
various other admonitions, there are two different statements of their
main rule. The first, Rule 45, says that pleadings "shall . . . (b) con-
sist of a statement in plain and concise language of the plaintiff's cause
of action or the defendant's grounds of defense. That an allegation be
evidentiary or be of legal conclusion shall not be ground for objection
21A complete bibliography of the already extensive literature appears in 3 ANNUAL.
HANDBOOK OP THE NATIONAL CONFEREr-NCE OF JUDIcIAL COUNCILS (1941) 43-96; and
see also (1941) 4 FED. RULES SERV. (Bibl.) 1-6. Compare, for example, (1941) 27
A.B.A.J. 494; Ford, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Pleadings, Motions, Parties
and Pre-Trial Procedure (1940) 1 FED. RULES DEc. 315; Yankwich, Jurisdiction and
Procedure of Federal District Courts Compared with California Procedure (1940)
1 FED. RuLES Dxc. 453; Armstrong, Adaptation of Procedural Reform to Tennessee
Practice (1939) 15 TENN. L. REv. 614 at 620; Hunter, One Year of Our Federal
Rules (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 1.
2 2 FED. RULES Civ. Pnoc. Rule 84. Texas lawyers may miss the former District
Court Rule 2, note 9 supra, which approved of "modes of expression wrought out
by long judicial experience, perpetrated [sic-but so in the Johnson reprint] in
books of forms"!
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when fair notice to the opponent is given by the allegations as a
whole." And they must also contain any other matter required by
law or rule for particular actions. The second is in Rule 47, which
states that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief "shall con-
tain . . . (a) a short statement of the cause of action sufficient
to give fair notice involved."
Now these statements may mean the same thing and in turn
be equivalent to the federal rule. But it is not difficult to think of
questions. Thus, do the rules contemplate that system advocated by
some, but not followed usually in this country, and certainly not in
the federal rules, of "notice pleading"? 23 If not, what does "fair notice"
mean?24 On the other hand, the statement of the "cause of action"
brings back those litigation-breeding words and suggests that details
of the cause or ground of suit, rather than a statement of claim show-
ing a right to legal relief, are to be required 5' It is believed that the
added and emphasized protestation makes for confusion, rather than
clarification.
Other rules call for like comment, such as the some six rules dealing
with amendments-Rules 62.-67-in addition to the rules concerning
supplemental pleadings referred to below, the requirement of verifi-
cation of the pleadings in some fifteen instances254 (which should be
either in all or none, preferably the latter, in view of the formal
character of the act) ,26 and so on.27  It is curious, too, to find every
23Cf. Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 HAIIv. L. REv. 501; ClTuK, CODE
PLEADING (1928) 29, 30, 36, 37, 163; CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PRocauRE
(2d ed. 1940) 182.2 4Without illustrative forms it would seem almost impossible to give specific
content to this rule. Cf. Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact" (1937) 4 U. er
Cm. L. !1v. 233; Cook. Statements of Fact in Pleading under the Codes (1921)
21 CoL. L. IlEv. 416; Clark The Complaint in Code Pleading (1926) 35 YALE L. J.
259; C.AR, CODE PLEADING (1928) 150-163; (1935) 9 CONN. B. J. 282-297. On
the other hand, pleading under the new federal rules has developed with reasonable
clarity. See Comment (1941) 10 For.DHAM L. REv. 252; (1940) 28 CALIF. L. REv.
235; Commentary (1941) 4 FED. RuLEs Snmv. 890; id. at 954. Compare Fisher, A
Vindication of Simplified Pleading (1940) 35 ILL. L. 1Ev. 270, with McCaskill, Easy
Pleading (1940) 35 ILL. L. lEv. 28.
25In addition to the articles cited in note 24 supra, see Clark, The Cause of Action
(1934) 82 U. or' PA. L. REv. 354; and Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924)
33 YALE L. 3. 817.
2IaTExAs RULES Civ. Puoc. (1941) Rule 93.
2 6As in FED. RULE Civ. Pnoc. Rule 11.
2 7There are instances where the purpose of the federal rule was not understood,
and a rewriting here makes the rule formal and innocuous. Such a case is FED.
RULES Civ. PRoc. Rule 8(c), last sentence, to the effect that a defense mistakenly
designated a counterclaim or vice versa is to be treated as properly designated.
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now and then a recognition of ancient obstructions, as when in Rule 41"each ground of recovery improperly joined may be docketed as a
separate suit between the same parties" [Query, is joinder not then
free, as Rule 51 says?], or when the first stated matter for pre-trial
conference is that of "dilatory pleas" [sic] *27a
Nevertheless the intent for uncomplicated form of averment may
be assumed. It is when we come to the pleading scheme proper-the
number and kind of pleadings to be filed-that our greatest question
arises. Now I do not find it entirely easy to discover the exact system.
It is not set forth seriatim, as was, for example, the course of pro-
ceeding at trial of Rule 265, referred to above; and obviously the
statements of Rules 45-98, particularly of 69-98, rely on previous
experience set forth in either statute or rule.2s But it seems reason-
ably clear (a) that each party files not only his original petition or
answer, as the case may be, but also as many supplemental petitions
and answers as he desires by way of "a response to the last preceding
pleading by the other party,"28a and (b) that while general demurrers
are forbidden, all kinds of "defect, omission or fault in a pleading
either of form or of substance" or any "defect, omission, obscurity,
duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations or the
pleading excepted to" may be taken advantage of either by "special
exception" in a supplemental pleading or by motion.2 1b (There is also
the attempt to provide for waiver of defects of substance, if not so
raised, Rule 90-an attempt doomed to non-success unless we get
judges willing to penalize litigants for the mistakes of their law-
yers. 29) One can only wonder when pleading can ever come to an
end. The answer would seem to be not until the lawyers are exhausted.
The system is just the contrary of the English system, substantially
adopted in the federal rules, which aims to do away with a series
of useless hearings not on the merits and to cut short all dilatory
preliminary sorties and assaultsY° This seems to me a final proof of
This was to avoid the difficulty and dispute over the nature of equitable defenses.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 429, 432, 443, 885; Clark, Trial of Actions Under the
Code (1926) 11 CoaN. L. Q. 482; 1 MooRE, FEDuRAL PtAricn (1938) 668. In
TE As RULEs Civ. Pnoc. (1941) Rule 71, the provision is made to apply indiscrimi-
nately to the misnomer of any pleading.
-7aTExAs RuLEs Civ. Pxoc. (1941) Rules 166, 175.
2sThe former rules were clearly stated; see note 9 supra.
2SaTFYs RuLns Crv. Paoc. (1941) Rules 69, 70, 78, 80, 83, 98.
2SbTE AS RuLEs Civ. Paoc. (1941) Rules 90, 91, 80, 98.
20FED. RuLEs Crv. Pnoc. RULE 12(h); Troy Automobile Exchange v. Home Ins.
Co., 221 N.Y. 68, 116 N.E. 786 (1917); CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 370.
30See note 12 supra.
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rejection by the Texas rules of the major premise of the newer
procedural reforms which definitely subordinates and shortens the
issue-formulating stage of adjudication to place the emphasis upon
trial on the merits.
I hope I have not rushed in too boldly where lack of intimate
experience may leave me defenseless. But I have spent much of my
life in advocating reforms in judicial administration and I like to
see energetic and vigorous reform movements of our profession come
to effective fruition. Of course, my natural bias in favor of the
federal rules is obvious. But I hope I am no slavish follower of merely
what is already written, and I have not hesitated to advocate -changes
in that system which I believe are in the direction of even added
simplicity and clarity.31 I trust that in time machinery will be de-
veloped through a functioning standing committee where such changes
can be thoroughly weighed, and, if desirable, adopted32 But whether
it be the federal, the English, or some other system, I do think sim-
plicity and lessened emphasis upon the formal exchange of paper
documents before trial is an essential. And I could wish that the
Texas committee, which has shown itself 'so effective in reaching its
conclusion and in making that known with great celerity, had given
more attention to this feature of proposed reform, or, if it intended
definitely to reject this feature, had stated its reasons for so doing.
Such a course would have been of material assistance to us who still
hope to labor both for pleading simplicity and pleading uniformity.
Elsewhere I have stated my view that piecemeal reform may often
be less desirable than no reform at all. For it may serve to upset the
bench and bar by the need of learning a new system which is little
advance and thus prejudice the securing of complete reform for many
years.3 3 I fear that my study of the Texas rules does not con-
duce to a change in those views. For it seems to me many undesirable
things have been perpetuated in a form unfortunately likely to be
more or less permanent. And the few definite reforms actually
3lCompare my suggestion as to changes in the federal summary judgment rule,
contained in the Judicial Administration Monograph Summary Judgments and a
Proposed Rule of Court (1941) 25 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 20, A. B. A. JUD. ADM. MONO-
GRAPHS, Ser. A, No. 5 (1941), 4 FED. RULEs Smv. 1005, and in United States v.
Adler's Creamery, Inc., 107 F.(2d) 987 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939), and as to bill of particulars
in (1939) 25 A.B.A.J. 22.
3-°Recommendations for a continuing committee were made in earlier reports of
the Advisory Committee. See Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure (1936)
Rule A, pp. 170-171, also Report of Advisory Committee (April, 1937) vii. As there
pointed out, they are in line with the views of students of procedural reform gen-
erally. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3463, 3464, and authorities cited.33Clark, Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform (1940) 24 J. Ams. JUD. Soc. 121.
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achieved, such as party joinder and pre-trial, could have been made
the subject of brief independent amendatory statutes and rules, to
which could easily have been added the vitally important declaratory
'and summary judgment procedure. But as it is, this revision, even
if not extensive in substance, appears in form so portentous that
reaction from it has apparently seemed appropriate. And so we
already have a retreat in the amendments of 1941. One may express
the hope that this does not adequately forecast the future of procedural
reform in Texas.
